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The traditional concept of sovereignty is largely independent of 
democratic legitimacy and completely indifferent to any obligation 
towards non-national citizens. But can this traditional concept meet the 
normative expectations of a post-traditional understanding of political 
authority as well as the challenges of an ever more interconnected 
world? In order to respond to this question, the Article analyzes 
the conceptual presuppositions that lie at the basis of the notion of 
“sovereignty,” first regarding its sources, and second regarding the 
ideas of rationality that are applied when sovereign actors operate. 
As far as the sources of sovereignty are concerned, it is argued that 
both of them — the “ascending” and the “descending” — although 
decisive for determining the quality of the legitimacy of political 
power, have little influence on a positive attitude of sovereigns 
towards aliens’ interests. To clarify the conditions for an opening 
of sovereign powers to solidarity, an assessment of the rationalities 
which are implemented when a sovereign puts actions into effect 
is therefore required. Yet most rationality concepts — or uses of 
practical reason — prove to be negative or at least useless when it 
comes to the question of supporting solidarity: the gamut ranges from 
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open hostility towards the idea of taking the interests of aliens into 
account, through substantial indifference, to a positive approach which 
presupposes, however, non-provable metaphysical assumptions or 
an individual mindset with no pretension of issuing norms of general 
validity. Only the communicative conception of reason meets the 
criteria for a convincing justification of solidarity towards aliens as an 
obligation. The author therefore concludes that only an “ascending” 
sovereignty based on a communicative understanding of rationality 
can be considered fully legitimate insofar as the sovereign power, 
in this case, first originates from the will of the citizens and, second, 
is morally, politically and legally obliged to a solidaristic attitude 
towards the justified interests of non-citizens.
IntroductIon
Sovereigns are generally thought to have obligations — mainly, if not 
exclusively — towards themselves. Indeed, the assumption that actors — in 
this case, states — do not accept any moral, political or juridical authority 
above and beyond themselves may imply that they reject any obligation of 
solidarity towards their fellow humans which could be drawn from such an 
authority. However, outlining the rejection of obligations that are not only 
external but can also be universal in their scope is just one way to define 
“sovereignty.” In fact, we have at least one alternative definition according 
to which “sovereignty” consists of the legitimate exercise of public power 
over a particular population, regarding a certain kind of social interaction, 
and generally but not necessarily with reference to a specific territory. If we 
adopt this second definition, sovereignty would no longer be in contradiction to 
responsibility for others or solidarity with non-citizens. Rather, responsibility 
and solidarity could be seen as two of the conditions that concur to make the 
exercise of public power — and, therefore, also sovereignty — legitimate. 
The transition from the traditional concept of “sovereignty” to its alternative 
understanding corresponds, furthermore, to the passage from its exclusive, 
hierarchical and authority-based conception to a rather inclusive, network-
oriented and dialogical view.
Given these premises, this Article will analyze the conceptual presuppositions 
that lie at the basis of both the traditional view of “sovereignty” and its 
alternative. In doing so, I will concentrate on two essential elements for the 
definition of “sovereignty”: first, the question regarding its sources; and, second, 
the conceptions of rationality that are implemented when sovereign authority 
is put into effect. As regards the fundaments of sovereignty — which will be 
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addressed in Part I of the Article — they are essentially of two kinds, depending 
primarily on the assumption about where the legitimation of public power 
is thought to come from. Following a first and more ancient understanding, 
the legitimation of public power has a “descending” character. Legitimate 
sovereignty is here “descending” in a twofold meaning: first, because the holder 
of the public power draws it from above, namely from natural or divine law; 
and second, because sovereign authority descends from the holder of public 
power to the governed. In any case, legitimate sovereignty is assumed to 
derive, as stated by the supporters of this conception, from an authority situated 
above the individuals, so that the holders of public power are vested with it 
without resorting to any investiture coming up from the governed. According 
to a second definition, to the contrary, legitimate sovereignty can only be 
established in an “ascending” way, namely — at least implicitly — by a free 
act of individuals willing to create a political community and the institutions 
that shall govern them. Here, then, the original basis for sovereignty lies in 
the autonomy of the free individuals. By building a political community and 
by establishing public power the individuals — now joined together to build 
a societas civilis, or a “commonwealth” — transfer a part or the whole of 
their autonomy to the hereby constituted public authority, conferring upon it 
sovereignty by this act.1
This distinction between different sources of sovereignty is essential 
in order to qualify a first and more usual dimension of its legitimacy; the 
question is whether sovereign authority meets the normative expectations of 
a post-traditional understanding of political power by rejecting metaphysical, 
religious or, in general, ontological assumptions — presently often reformulated 
in technocratic guise — and by relying only on the unavoidable epistemic 
fundament created by the will of the governed. Yet in an ever more interconnected 
1 We could add a possible third source of sovereignty, namely the brute fact of a 
power that does not resort to any reason to justify its existence. If we consider 
the question more closely, however, we cannot but notice that even Machiavelli, 
as the master of Realpolitik, tends to justify power with reasons that go beyond 
the brute exercise of force. Indeed, the Discourses on Livy are mainly dedicated 
to the reasons for a strong and free republic. And even The Prince ends with 
an appeal for the freedom of Italy that has little to do with a sheer exaltation of 
brute power. Unjustified sovereignty seems not to have — at least in political 
philosophy — many supporters. See Niccolò Machiavelli, il PriNciPe (Einaudi 
1995) (1513) (translated to English in Niccolò Machiavelli, The PriNce (Rufus 
Goodwin trans., The Modern Library 2007)); Niccolò Machiavelli, Discorsi 
soPra la PriMa Deca Di TiTo livio (Einaudi 1997) (1513-1519) (translated to 
English in Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses oN livy (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Nathan Tarcov trans., Penguin Books 1998)).
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world, legitimacy cannot be accomplished by just this content: since sovereign 
powers can do harm — in particular to non-citizens — to a much broader 
extent, the legitimacy of sovereignty cannot be referred only to the exclusive 
involvement of the members of the single political community. Rather, the 
idea of legitimate sovereignty has to be updated and integrated with a further 
aspect, namely a solidaristic attitude towards aliens’ interests. 
The inquiry into the sources of sovereignty, however, does not shed much 
light on this second — more future-oriented — aspect of the legitimacy of 
sovereignty. Indeed, the preference for a legitimation of sovereignty either 
coming from “above” or, to the contrary, its “bottom-up” conception has few 
consequences, if any, with regard to the existence of an obligation, for the 
sovereign power, of solidarity towards non-citizens. A sovereign power with 
a “descending” legitimacy, in fact, can be open to the needs and arguments of 
aliens, or it can be exclusively self-referential — and an “ascending” public 
power can be either as well. Therefore, if we want to take into account the 
reasons for or against solidarity towards non-citizens, we have to shift the focus 
of the analysis from the sources of sovereign public power to the conceptions 
of rationality that are applied when sovereign authority is put into action. 
The starting point here is the assumption that exercising sovereignty always 
implies the use of practical reason and, as a consequence, the application of 
a certain kind of rationality. 
In the second Part of the Article I will therefore analyze six different 
conceptions of rationality that stand behind the idea of sovereignty, always 
concentrating in particular on the question whether they can support solidarity 
towards non-citizens or rather reject it. Of the six approaches to the practical 
use of reason, only the last conception — namely communicative rationality 
— can provide a coherent rationale for justifying not just the traditional idea 
of legitimate sovereignty, implying the democratic consent of the citizens, 
but also its no less fundamental updating and semantic extension due to the 
challenges of the post-national constellation, i.e., the taking into account of 
the interests of non-citizens involved by national decisions. 
In the third and last Part I will then try to bring together the results of both 
strands of analysis, drawing the outlines of a concept of “sovereignty” which 
is, at the same time, bottom-up, inclusive and open to the “others.” 
I. the SourceS of SovereIgnty
By considering the sources of sovereignty as the first theoretical presupposition 
of the concept, I address essentially four questions. First, where is sovereignty 
thought to derive from? Second, how does this derivation affect the legitimacy 
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of sovereign power? Third, which kind of source of sovereignty may be 
considered suitable for a society in which no given and uncontested authorities 
— be they based on religion, metaphysical assumptions or technocratic 
knowledge — can be accepted? And fourth, are the sources of sovereignty 
of any relevance to the opening of sovereign powers to the interests and 
arguments of non-citizens? 
As anticipated in the Introduction, sovereignty originates in two different 
ways: through a “descending,” or through an “ascending” movement. Starting 
from the history of Western political ideas, I will dedicate the following 
two Sections (A and B) to “setting the scene” by focusing on the first two 
abovementioned questions: the foundations from which sovereignty can be 
drawn, and their implications for the legitimation of sovereign power. On the 
basis of these considerations, I will then move on — in Section C — to the 
third and fourth questions and, therefore, to some provisional conclusions as 
regards the reshaping of the concept of sovereignty. Roughly summarized, 
only the “ascending” source of sovereignty will prove to be acceptable in a 
liberal and democratic society, which does not mean, however, that it should 
also lead, in principle, to more solidarity with aliens.
A. The “Descending” Concept of Sovereignty
The alleged higher truth, from which — following some strands of Western 
political thought — sovereignty is alleged to be derived, can be of two kinds: 
natural law, or divine law. The best example of the idea of sovereignty as 
derived from natural law is provided by Jean Bodin. In his Six livres de la 
République he asserts that “sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power 
vested in a commonwealth.”2 Therefore, a sovereign prince is not bound by 
laws (legibus solutus), and the civil norms promulgated by him, “even when 
founded on truth and right reason, proceed simply from his own free will.”3 To 
justify sovereignty, Bodin resorts to the old Aristotelian theory of the familistic 
origin of the polity. Following this conception, the “commonwealth may be 
defined as the rightly ordered government of a number of families, and of 
those things which are their common concern, by a sovereign power.”4 The 
premises are thus twofold: first, according to natural law the absolute power 
within the family belongs — or, we should rather say, belonged in Bodin’s 
2 JeaN BoDiN, six livres De la réPuBlique 85 (Imprimerie de Jean de Tournes 
1579) (translated to English in JeaN BoDiN, six Books of The coMMoNwealTh 
bk. I, ch. VIII (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955)).
3 Id. at 92 (English: bk. I, ch. VIII).
4 Id. at 1 (English: bk. I, ch. I).
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time — to its head and should not be challenged by any family member; and, 
second, the political community is nothing but an enlarged family. The result 
is that the same power deriving from the order of natural law, when it comes 
to that big family that is the political community, is rightfully put in the hands 
of the holder of public power and should not be contested by the subjects. 
In today’s political thought and praxis, Bodin’s idea may find its continuation 
— or revival — in the technocratic assumption of an allegedly superior 
knowledge and expertise, with which the holders of public authority are 
thought to be vested. An excellent example of the renewal of paternalism 
in technocratic guise has been recently provided by the measures taken by 
the European Union in order to meet the debt crisis.5 Surely, technocratic 
paternalism is far from absolute, so that technocratic sovereignty — provided 
that we can apply the concept of “sovereignty” in these cases — is of a 
quite different kind than in Bodin’s conception. Nevertheless, the idea that 
an authority should derive the legitimacy to take decisions from a supposed 
natural supremacy — be this rooted in tradition or in knowledge — shows 
the continuity and liveliness of the “descending” conception of public power. 
For a second strand of political thought, the reference to natural law is just 
the first step on the way to an even higher truth, namely the law of God. In 
other words, sovereignty is here derived from God as the only true holder of 
sovereign power. The way in which sovereignty then descends from God to 
the temporal powers was articulated in different forms during the golden age 
of Christian — and then Christian-Catholic — political theology, between 
the Middle Ages and early Modern Ages. According to the earlier and most 
radical interpretation, sovereignty was transferred from God to the Church 
and then, only in a second step, to the secular rulers.6 A later — already more 
secular — conception still derived the power of mundane sovereigns from 
God, but directly and not through papal mediation.7 The most modern strand 
of Catholic theologians of the School of Salamanca went even a step further, 
asserting that the transition of legitimate power from God to the worldly 
rulers had to pass through popular sovereignty, although the people, after 
5 JürgeN haBerMas, iM sog Der TechNokraTie [iN The riPTiDe of TechNocracy] 
82 et seq. (2013); Fritz W. Scharpf, Die Finanzkrise als Krise der ökonomischen 
und rechtlichen Überintegration [The Financial Crisis as Result of Economic 
and Legal Overintegration], in greNzeN Der euroPäischeN iNTegraTioN [The 
liMiTs of euroPeaN iNTegraTioN] 51 (Claudio Franzius, Franz C. Mayer & 
Jürgen Neyer eds., 2014).
6 heNry hosTieNsis, suMMa aurea (Servanius 1556) (1250-1261).
7 fraNcisco De viToria, relecTio De PoTesTaTe civili [oN civil Power] 58 (Akademie 
Verlag 1992) (1528) (translated to English in fraNcisco De viToria, PoliTical 
wriTiNgs (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991)).
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having transferred the power to the rulers, remained actually devoid of the 
real possibility of influencing the political outcomes.8 
All these conceptions can be regarded as belonging to the past. Nevertheless, 
the idea that sovereign authority is only legitimate when it respects the higher 
laws of God has somehow survived up to the present time under the guise 
of the principle of dignity.9 Indeed, if political power has to protect human 
dignity in order to obtain legitimacy, and the Catholic Church claims for itself 
the right to define what human dignity is, then the consequence cannot but 
be that the Church still maintains the pretension — albeit indirectly — of 
possessing the key to sovereign power and that the interpretation of the law 
of God should still influence the secular political and juridical order. 
B. The “Ascending” Understanding of Sovereignty
The “ascending” idea of sovereignty arose as a consequence of the transition 
from the holistic to the individualistic paradigm of social order and was 
introduced by Thomas Hobbes in the middle of the seventeenth century. 
Hobbes overturned for the first time in history the traditional hierarchy between 
individual and community, collocating the individuals, as the holders of 
fundamental rights and the source of any legitimation of authority, at the center 
of political life. The starting point of his political philosophy was, therefore, 
no longer the society as a factum brutum, a “brute fact” based on the natural 
sociability of humans and organized in an organic hierarchical structure,10 
but the individual endowed with inherent rights, interests and reason.11 In 
this original state of nature — a fictional condition, presented by Hobbes in 
order to focus attention not on the historic beginning of society, but on the 
ontological foundation as well as on the conceptual preconditions of a just 
8 fraNcisco suarez, De legibus, ac Deo legislatore [On Laws and God the 
Lawgiver], in selecTioNs froM Three works of fraNcisco suarez 3, bk. III, 
chs. III, IV, at 377 (James Brown Scott ed., Clarendon Press 1944) (1612) 
[hereinafter suarez, De legibus]; fraNcisco suarez, Defensio fidei catholicae 
et apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores [Defence of the Catholic and 
Apostolic Faith], in selecTioNs froM Three works of fraNcisco suarez, supra, 
at 647, bk. VI, ch. IV, bk. III, chs. III, IV, at 718.
9 On the laical and religious definition of dignity, see uNDersTaNDiNg huMaN 
DigNiTy (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013); PoPe BeNeDicT xvi’s legal 
ThoughT: a Dialogue oN The fouNDaTioN of law (Marta Cartabia & Andrea 
Simoncini eds., 2015).
10 ThoMas hoBBes, De cive, bk. I, chs. I, II (Royston 1651) (1642) [hereinafter 
hoBBes, De cive].
11 Id. bk. I, ch. I.
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order — individuals are free and equal.12 However, they are also constantly 
in danger of being assaulted and harmed by fellow humans in search — as 
every individual in the state of nature always is — of more resources in order 
to improve their life conditions.13 Therefore, natural reason commands to 
leave the state of nature and build a society (societas civilis), in which life, 
security and property are safeguarded.14 
In Hobbes’s view the Commonwealth is thus not the original and axiologically 
highest entity in the ethical world, but rather a tool that humans give to 
themselves in order to achieve social stability. In Hobbes’s understanding, 
sovereignty is ascending insofar as it is no longer seen as a feature that the 
given political authority draws from the laws of God or from its alleged natural 
superiority. Rather, it arises from the original freedom and self-reliance of the 
individuals who create a sovereign authority through an act of free will, by 
means of the transferal of rights to the public power, and in order to guarantee, 
on the basis of a legitimacy coming from the bottom up, an adequate protection 
of the subjective entitlements. Therefore, sovereignty is legitimate only if 
it aims at safeguarding fundamental rights and is grounded on a freely and 
explicitly expressed people’s consent — in the strand of political thought 
initiated by Hobbes, in particular, by means of a contract (pactum unionis).
In contractualism, then, the sovereignty of public power is always rooted 
in the rights, interests and reason of the individuals. Yet differences emerge 
between scholars when it comes to the extent of competences that the sovereign 
public power is vested with. This depends on how many rights the individuals 
who are willing to create a polity are supposed to have transferred to the 
sovereign authority through the founding contract. In the cases in which these 
rights are just few — as in Locke’s liberal theory of state15 — the sovereign 
power has only the competence of making sure that the interactions between 
citizens can unfold peacefully by guaranteeing law and order. As a result, the 
citizens maintain all their original entitlements except for the right to take 
the law into their own hands, and the danger of an excessive concentration 
of competences is prevented by the separation of powers and by a strong 
parliament.
12 Id. bk. I, ch. III.
13 Id. bk. I, chs. I, X; ThoMas hoBBes, leviaThaN, or The MaTTer, forM, aND 
Power of a coMMoNwealTh ecclesiasTical aND civil ch. XIII (Crooke 1651) 
[hereinafter hoBBes, leviaThaN].
14 hoBBes, leviaThaN, supra note 13, ch. XIV; hoBBes, De cive, supra note 10, 
bk. I, ch. II.
15 JohN locke, Two TreaTises of goverNMeNT bk. II, ch. 7, § 90 (Awnsham-Churchill 
1698) (1690); id. bk. II, ch. 11, § 134; id. bk. II, ch. 12, § 143; id. bk. II, ch. 13, 
§ 150.
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Contrarily, from Hobbes’s pessimistic perspective social order can be 
safeguarded only if the individuals give up all their rights, excluding the right 
to life protection and — very partially — the right to negative liberty as the 
freedom to pursue economic activities in order to achieve “happiness,” yet only 
insofar as this does not jeopardize the guarantee of social peace and order.16 
As a consequence, Hobbes’s contractualism is characterized by the passage 
from the condition of free individuals to that of subjects almost devoid of any 
rights — a theoretically rather contradictory self-chosen annihilation of liberty 
that vests sovereign power with an almost unlimited amount of competences. 
A further alternative is represented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s radical-
democratic theory of the “social contract.” Here too sovereignty is created 
by means of an alienation of rights — an alienation which is, at least at first 
glance, even more intransigent than in Hobbes’s view. Rousseau’s social 
contract provides for an alienation of all natural rights, without exception.17 The 
difference, which characterizes the more citizen-friendly attitude of the French 
philosopher, is made by the fact that, whereas in Hobbes’s construction citizens 
alienate their rights to a monarch, turning their status into that of subjects, 
in Rousseau the citizens alienate their rights to themselves, now constituted 
as a sovereign political community, as a volonté générale, or a “general 
will.”18 This way, the preferences and interests of the concrete individuals are 
transubstantiated into a rather abstract, if not obscure, concept of an allegedly 
“true” will of the political community. The sovereign authority of the volonté 
générale is, in fact, so unrestrained that, also due to an insufficient internal 
articulation of powers,19 it is not obliged to give any guarantee to its “subjects,” 
who may even be “forced to be free.”20 As a consequence, Rousseau’s idea of 
democracy always runs the risk of falling into authoritarianism.
c. Legitimacy and Solidarity
A first — rather usual — definition of legitimacy concerns primarily the 
question of how sovereign power can be justified before the members of the 
polity, i.e., before those who have to obey the norms issued by the sovereign. 
16 hoBBes, leviaThaN, supra note 13, ch. XVII; hoBBes, De cive, supra note 10, 
bk. II, chs. II, XIII.
17 JeaN-Jacques rousseau, Du coNTracT social, ou PriNciPes Du DroiT PoliTique 
51 (Garnier-Flammarion 1966) (1762) (translated to English in JeaN-Jacques 
rousseau, The social coNTracT (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 
1968)).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 52.
20 Id. at 54.
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From this perspective, the distinction between the “descending” and the 
“ascending” understanding of sovereignty is clear-cut and the criterion for a 
normative evaluation of the two conceptions is unambiguous. Indeed, within 
a post-metaphysical ideological and political context, two assumptions have 
to be regarded as self-evident. First, no supposedly higher truth of natural or 
divine origin — and, we might add, of scientific or economic or, in a word, of 
technocratic origin either — can be legitimately imposed on the whole political 
community. Second, as a consequence of the first assumption, sovereign 
authority is legitimate and has the justifiable competence of issuing decisions 
that bind the whole society only if it is created from the bottom up. Therefore, 
only the “ascending” conception of sovereignty can found its legitimacy.
The question is much more complicated, however, as regards a second 
aspect, which is a necessary consequence of increased interconnections in 
the globalized world, namely the idea of legitimate sovereignty as implying 
openness of sovereign powers to solidarity towards aliens. In fact, both 
understandings of the sources of sovereignty are compatible with either 
option: egoism and unselfishness.21 The ambiguity of the approach becomes 
already clear by analyzing the conception of Bodin, the first and probably 
most radical supporter of the absoluteness of sovereignty. Bodin concedes 
that the power of the sovereign should be limited by divine and natural law, 
and therefore by a law which — at least implicitly — binds beyond the 
borders of the single république.22 Nonetheless, this limitation is marginal 
since the sovereign, being the secular imago of the almighty God, has the 
right to interpret the suprapositive norms freely, i.e., without any secular 
or ecclesiastic control. Eventually, in Bodin’s work sovereign self-reliance 
thus gains the upper hand. Yet even from the perspective of one of the most 
uncompromising advocates of sovereignty in the history of political thought, 
the broader horizon of humanity is not radically ignored.
Although doomed in Bodin’s conception to award priority to selfishness, the 
cosmopolitan perspective is, on the contrary, central to the idea of a sovereignty 
21 I use “egoism” and “unselfishness” with reference to the actions of both individual 
and collective agents. The non-distinction between individual and collective 
attitudes is based on the assumption of a continuity between the rationality 
displayed in individual actions and that applied by collective agents. In this 
sense, states cannot be regarded as “billiard balls,” but represent in their actions 
the same approach to the interests of “others” that is prevalent in the society 
from which they emerge. As regards the critique of the “billiard balls” theory, 
see aNNe-Marie slaughTer, iNTerNaTioNal law aND iNTerNaTioNal relaTioNs 
507 (2000); and Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics, 51 iNT’l org. 513 (1997).
22 BoDiN, supra note 2, at 91.
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based on the law of God. Although in the passage from the Middle Ages to 
the early Modern Ages Christian and Christian-Catholic political theology 
increasingly accepted the principle of the distinct identities of the political 
and juridical orders of the single states, nevertheless these orders were always 
regarded as legitimate only insofar as they respected the higher commands of 
divine law.23 And when, as a result of the principles of the Reformation, the 
Protestant theologians dismissed the idea that reason can help to discover the 
divine law, the reference to the cosmopolitan community of humankind and 
to the jus gentium as its common law substituted for the commands of God 
in guaranteeing a universalistic horizon to sovereignty.24
As regards the technocratic variant of the idea of a sovereignty derived 
from above — in this case, from the assumption of a higher competence which 
leads eventually to an output-oriented legitimacy — it is precisely that kind 
of international authorities, in which legitimacy is identified with knowledge-
based expertise, that fervently advocates overcoming the traditional, state-
centered and selfish concept of sovereignty.25 However, the way in which 
these international authorities go about overcoming traditional sovereignty 
can hardly be associated with inclusive solidarity.
Similar contradictions can be found also among the scholars who support 
the “ascending” interpretation of sovereignty. The political philosophy of 
contractualism, on which the “ascending” conception of sovereignty was initially 
based, was conceived as a theoretical way to re-found legitimacy within the 
scope of the single polity. For that reason, the most important exponents of 
contractualism, for one and a half centuries after its first formulation, showed 
little interest in the question of order beyond national borders. Insofar as the 
problem was addressed, the relations between states were considered not in 
terms of solidarity, but rather — as in the state of nature — of competition.26 
23 See the definition of the leges civiles in suarez, De legibus, supra note 8, bk. III, 
at 361.
24 hugo groTius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1646).
25 The exercise of PuBlic auThoriTy By iNTerNaTioNal iNsTiTuTioNs (Armin von 
Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010).
26 hoBBes, leviaThaN, supra note 13, ch. XXX; locke, supra note 15, bk. II, 
ch. 2, § 14, bk. II, ch. 12, § 145, bk. II, ch. 16 § 183; Baruch De sPiNoza, Tractatus 
Politicus [Political Treatise], in 3 oPera ch. III (Carl Gebhardt ed., Winters 
1924) (1670) (translated to English in Baruch De sPiNoza, CoMPleTe works 
676 (Michael L. Morgan ed., Samuel Shirley trans., Hackett 2002)); Baruch 
De sPiNoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [Theological-Political Treatise], in 
3 oPera, supra, ch. XVI (translated to English in sPiNoza, coMPleTe works, 
supra, at 383). 
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The turnabout — i.e., the formulation, for the first time, of a theory that 
bound “ascending” sovereignty with an explicitly universalistic understanding 
of humanity — came with Immanuel Kant. One of his most relevant merits 
consists, indeed, of the introduction of a three-level construction of public 
law — domestic, international and cosmopolitan law27 — which explicitly 
comprehends, at its third level, a corpus juris addressed to the specification 
of rights belonging to all human beings beyond their affiliation as citizens 
and regardless of it. In other words, while the domestic public law defines 
the rules of interaction within the single polity and the international law gives 
order to the relations between states, the cosmopolitan law — which has to 
be, in Kant’s view, positive and not only natural law — specifies entitlements 
of every human being vis-à-vis any state of which he is not a citizen, or vis-
à-vis any other human who is not a citizen of the same polity. The novelty 
introduced by Kant did not, however, remain unchallenged. Indeed, the 
connection between the idea of a bottom-up legitimation and a solidaristic 
attitude towards “others” has always been — and still is28 —opposed by 
those who believe that precisely those governments that are accountable to 
their citizens tend to refrain from taking into account the interests of aliens.
In conclusion, no direct relationship can be ascertained between the 
sources of sovereignty — “ascending” or “descending” — and the possible 
obligation of solidarity towards “others”: solidarity can come with a bottom-
up legitimation or with one from above, and the same goes for selfishness 
as well. Thus, if we consider sovereignty from the perspective of its origin, 
it seems that we cannot collect any evidence that may help us to understand 
whether sovereignty also implies duties towards non-citizens and why, if 
this is true, solidarity should be owed to them. If we want to ascertain the 
possible reasons for sovereignty to be opened to arguments and interests of 
the “others,” we have to change the focus of analysis and concentrate on the 
forms of rationality implemented by sovereign acts.
27 iMMaNuel kaNT, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in XI 
werkausgaBe 203 (Suhrkamp 1977) (1795) (translated to English in iMMaNuel 
kaNT, TowarDs PerPeTual Peace aND oTher wriTiNgs oN PoliTics, Peace, aND 
hisTory 67 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., Yale Univ. Press 
2006)).
28 Examples range from nation-centered democracy theories, see infra Section 
II.A., to communitarianism, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, 
Lecture at Univ. of Kansas, Dept. of Phil. (The Lindley Lecture) (Mar. 26, 1984), 
available at https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/12398/Is%20
Patriotism%20a%20Virtue-1984.pdf, to rational choice approaches, see Jack l. 
golDsMiTh & eric a. PosNer, The liMiTs of iNTerNaTioNal law 212 (2005).
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II. rAtIonAlIty And SolIdArIty
When a sovereign actor carries out an action, it necessarily makes use of its 
practical reason, i.e., it employs a certain understanding of how it should 
reasonably act in the world. In other words, it applies justifiable criteria for 
its action, where the justification may be implicit or explicit and the criteria 
can take different forms, each of them characterizing a specific rationality of 
action. Insofar as the actor puts its action into full effect, the rationality that 
is here applied can be regarded as implemented. I assume here, furthermore, 
that collective actors — in particular states — employ in their actions in the 
international arena the same rationality that is predominant within the societies 
respectively represented by them.29 In other words, the state is not seen as an 
autonomous “subject” with its own rationality; rather, its executive institutions 
operating in the international context are assumed to display the rationality of 
the society on which these institutions are based. Therefore, if an obligation 
of solidarity towards aliens should be rationally proved, this rational “ought” 
is regarded as binding, first, upon the individual human beings, and then, only 
derivatively, due to the fact that these individuals build a society, upon the 
institutions of this society as well. The mediation between individuals and 
states within the process of implementation of rationality is generally assumed 
by organizations of the civil society, such as political parties or NGOs. 
Given these premises, I will examine in the following the most relevant 
kinds of rationality which are employed when sovereignty is put into effect. 
Before going into the detailed analysis, however, a clarification has yet to be 
made. Solidarity is understood, here, primarily as solidarity towards “others,” 
i.e., towards aliens or non-citizens. Therefore, the different uses of practical 
reason will be scrutinized mainly from the perspective of their capacity to 
justify solidaristic attitudes towards those who cannot be regarded as fellow 
citizens, i.e., as citizens of the same polity. Beyond this specification, however, 
it need be remarked that in most cases the application of a certain kind or 
rationality leads to the same results as regards solidarity towards citizens and 
aliens. When rationality is indifferent towards solidarity — as in its functional 
variant — indifference extends from citizens to aliens, and when it can be used 
to justify both egoism and solidarity, as in the case of strategic rationality, 
both results can be applied indifferently to fellow citizens or to the “others.” 
Analogously, if rationality grounds solidarity — as proposed, albeit with 
quite different arguments, by the supporters of its holistic, deconstructed or 
communicative understanding — no substantial distinction, and certainly no 
exclusion, is made between “in” and “out.” Just one conception of rationality 
29 See supra note 21.
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represents an exception: here, solidarity can be supported, but just in favor of 
the members of the same polity. This is the case as regards the understanding 
of rationality with which I will begin the analysis.
A. Particularistic Rationality
The first conception of rationality that has to be taken into consideration is 
what we can call a particularistic understanding of reason. We can find its 
best expression in the idea of sovereignty realized in the tradition of national 
constitutionalism. According to this approach, developed in particular by 
prestigious German constitutionalists like Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof and 
Die ter Grimm, only the sovereign national state, based on the primacy of the 
national constitutions, can guarantee the rule of law and a high standard of 
legitimacy, both of which would be lost in the context of a cosmopolitan turn 
of constitutionalism.30 More concretely, the unity of the law31 is based on the 
unity of public power32 — and this, for its part, cannot but be the result of 
the national unity of the people (Volk).33 Isensee identifies the reasons for the 
constitutional unity of the people with “geographic and geopolitical situation, 
historic origin and experience, cultural specificity, economic necessities of 
the people, natural and political conditions.”34 None of these elements can 
be regarded as the consequence of free decisions taken by the members of 
the political community. To the contrary, all of them are expressions of a 
pre-political state of facts, of a quasi-natural condition of the Volk, on which 
political and legal institutions are built. They thus constitute the Volk, as a 
“community of destiny,”35 before and beyond any individual decision or 
preference.36 
30 Dieter Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization, 
12 coNsTellaTioNs 447 (2005).
31 Josef Isensee, Staat und Verfassung [State and Constitution], in haNDBuch Des 
sTaaTsrechTs Der BuNDesrePuBlik DeuTschlaND, BaND i: gruNDlageN voN 
sTaaT uND verfassuNg [haNDBook of The sTaTe law of The feDeral rePuBlic 
of gerMaNy, vol. i: fuNDaMeNTal eleMeNTs of sTaTe aND coNsTiTuTioN] 591, 
619 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
32 Id. at 620.
33 Id. at 634.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Paul Kirchhof, Der deutsche Staat im Prozess der europäischen Integration 
[The German State Within the Process of European Integration], in haNDBuch 
Des sTaaTsrechTs Der BuNDesrePuBlik DeuTschlaND, BaND i, supra note 31, at 
855, 869.
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While in Isensee’s and Kirchhof’s interpretations the sovereign unity of the 
Volk has a generally ethnic character, where ethnic identity is understood as 
comprehending a large number of mostly pre-communicative elements, Dieter 
Grimm locates it rather in the common language spoken by all members of the 
people.37 Only the existence of a shared language — following Grimm — enables 
the members of the political community to legitimate the institutions of public 
power as well as their decisions.38 Here lies the key to a better understanding 
of the concept of rationality generally adopted by the supporters of the nation-
based strand of constitutionalism. Correctly, law is identified as fundamentally 
linked to linguistic communication. Linguistic communication, however, is 
not defined on principles of transcendental pragmatics,39 but rather depends 
on the specific identity of national languages. For that reason, language can 
never be universal; rather, we have — according to this approach — a plurality 
of languages, each of them specific to a particular cultural community, i.e., 
a nation. Moreover, if rationality is necessarily embedded in language, and 
language is no less necessarily the language of a nation, rationality itself will 
be deeply linked to the “spirit” of a nation. In other words, if we do not admit 
any universal language on which rationality is grounded, we will not have 
any universal rationality either.
According to the particularistic understanding of reason, then, rationality 
is never situated beyond the limits of a particular society, since it is essentially 
embedded in the language, history and traditions of a specific group of 
individuals, or of a “people.” We thus have many rationalities, each of them 
specific to an individual society, but we do not have any “universalistic” 
reason that may lead the members of the single polity beyond the borders of 
their original belonging, transcending their selfishness and connecting them 
to every human being. Being exclusively and sometimes obsessively centered 
on the vital interests of the single political community, this conception of 
rationality may sustain a solidaristic attitude towards fellow citizens insofar 
as solidarity is regarded as an instrument for consolidating the cohesion of the 
particularistic social group. It is, however, completely inadequate to support 
solidarity towards non-citizens and represents, rather, one of the most frequent 
arguments brought by the counterpart into the debate.40
37 Dieter Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfasssung? [Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?], 50 JurisTeNzeiTuNg 581 (1995).
38 Id. at 588.
39 karl-oTTo aPel, TraNsforMaTioN Der PhilosoPhie [The TraNsforMaTioN of 
PhilosoPhy] (1973).
40 This does not mean that particularistic rationality denies any kind of solidarity, 
but just that, if solidarity under certain circumstances should take place, it would 
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B. Functional Rationality
Systems theory reduces rationality to its functional dimension.41 It does so 
by eschewing any reference to an overarching rationality that, starting from 
the transcendental capacities of individuals, encompasses all forms of social 
interaction. No universal reason — subjective or intersubjective — is here 
envisaged, at either the descriptive or prescriptive level. To the contrary, systems 
theory — in particular, Niklas Luhmann as one of its most important exponents 
— claims that many rationalities can be observed by the social scientist, each 
of them characterizing the way one specific social subsystem functions. In 
other words, while we cannot detect — according to Luhmann’s systems 
theory — any extra-systemic rationality, we do observe the implementation 
of different rational processes. These guarantee that the manifold functional 
subsystems of society deliver the performances for which they have developed 
and that are necessary for the continuity and further improvement — in the 
sense of higher efficiency — of the whole society.
The rationality of systems theory is transnational in essence. Indeed, 
functional rationality does not stop at the borders of nation-states. In particular, 
it has two important features for the development of its transnational vocation. 
First, every social subsystem is characterized by self-referentiality42 and 
“operative closeness.”43 Second, functional rationality has a tendency to 
enhance the efficiency of the social system.44 The first feature stems from 
the fact that society as a whole differentiates itself into specialized social 
subsystems each with its own function and rationality already within every 
single nation-state — or at least in those where society is not oppressed by a 
ubiquitous public power. And, provided that social subsystems tend to develop 
according to the criterion of the highest efficiency by accomplishing their 
be in the form of arbitrary compassion, not of a moral or political obligation.
41 See Niklas luhMaNN, Das rechT Der gesellschafT (1993) (translated to English 
in Niklas luhMaNN, law as a social sysTeM (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus 
A. Zeigert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004)) [hereinafter luhMaNN, Das rechT 
Der gesellschafT]; Niklas luhMaNN, Die gesellschafT Der gesellschafT (1997) 
(translated to English in Niklas luhMaNN, Theory of socieTy (Rhodes Barrett 
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2012)) [hereinafter luhMaNN, Die gesellschafT Der 
gesellschafT]; Niklas luhMaNN, soziale sysTeMe: gruNDriss eiNer allgeMeiNeN 
Theorie (1984) (translated to English in Niklas luhMaNN, social sysTeMs (John 
Bednarz, Jr. trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995)).
42 luhMaNN, Die gesellschafT Der gesellschafT, supra note 41, at 65, 92.
43 luhMaNN, Das rechT Der gesellschafT, supra note 41, at 44.
44 luhMaNN, Die gesellschafT Der gesellschafT, supra note 41, at 145; luhMaNN, 
Das rechT Der gesellschafT, supra note 41, at 572.
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functional tasks — which is the second feature of systemic rationality — 
homologous subsystems from different countries have a propensity to merge, 
since larger social structures guarantee better operational conditions. The 
consequence is the establishment of transnational social and legal subsystems45 
— a phenomenon which has been analyzed in particular with reference to the 
contemporary lex mercatoria, i.e., the private law subsystem autonomously 
created by economic actors in order to regulate their transactions beyond the 
borders of the nation-states.46
However, transnationality does not mean solidarity — nor does it imply 
it.47 Indeed, authors who interpret society using systems theory have tried to 
conceptualize the defense of human rights as a transnational political and legal 
subsystem itself, or in other words as a “universal law” (Weltrecht) or a “global-
constitution” (Globalverfassung), formal expressions of a comprehensive 
lex humana centered around the protection of fundamental rights.48 Others 
have addressed the question of justice with the instruments of the functional 
epistemology of systems theory by transferring social conflict from the 
contradiction between different forms of rationality — in particular between 
the communicative rationality of the lifeworld and the strategic rationality 
which dominates the individual approach to functional systems49 — to the 
45 Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Fragmentierung des Weltrechts: 
Vernetzung globaler Regimes statt etatistischer Rechtseinheit [Fragmentation of 
the Global Legal System], in welTsTaaT uND welTsTaaTlichkeiT. BeoBachTuNgeN 
gloBaler PoliTischer sTrukTurBilDuNg [worlD sTaTe aND worlD sTaTe-hooD] 
37 (Mathias Albert & Rudolf Stichweh eds., 2007).
46 Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, 
in gloBal law wiThouT a sTaTe 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
47 From the private law perspective, however, it has been claimed that private 
interactions beyond the borders of the single polities can account precisely 
for that kind of cosmopolitan mutual recognition that is often missing in the 
public dimension. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships 
(Working Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463537. In my 
view, yet, solidarity should not be just left to personal priorities, but should be 
“constitutionalized” — and therefore be seen as a concern of public law — not 
only within the borders of the individual political communities but also in the 
legal context of the international community.
48 aNDreas fischer-lescaNo, gloBalverfassuNg: Die gelTuNgsBegrüNDuNg Der 
MeNscheNrechTe [gloBal coNsTiTuTioN: oN The fouNDaTioN of The valiDiTy of 
huMaN righTs] (2005); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Verfassung 
der Weltgesellschaft [The Constitution of the World Society], 88 archiv für 
rechTs- uND sozialPhilosoPhie [archives legal & soc. Phil.] 349 (2002).
49 On strategic and communicative rationality see, respectively, infra Sections 
II.C, II.F.
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interior of the single social subsystem.50 Following this explanatory strategy, 
social conflict is reduced to a tension between different answers to the question 
regarding which policies should be applied in order to guarantee the best 
accomplishment of the subsystem’s functional tasks. But solidarity with the 
powerless — and, among these, with aliens — may go far beyond the search 
for the best way to accomplish functions. And in some cases, it may even run 
against this principle. Therefore, why should we owe solidarity, nonetheless, 
to the excluded and neglected? Systemic rationality does not explicitly rule 
out this obligation; yet it does not give us any argument in favor of it either.
C. Strategic Rationality
A third conception conceives of rationality exclusively in its strategic dimension. 
In this sense, reason is the instrument that enables us to maximize our payoffs. 
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner have argued that this kind of perspective 
justifies the egoistic behavior of states.51 Beginning with the assumption that 
every rational actor will prefer the choice that promises to obtain the highest 
immediate benefits, and arguing that states, in international relations, always 
face the possibility of being trapped in a situation comparable to that of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, Goldsmith and Posner maintain that every rationally acting 
state, given the fact that the behavior of its counterparts will be unpredictable 
in most cases, cannot but pursue its own egoistic interest. Neither customary 
international law nor treaty law can build a reliable normative framework 
of shared and effective rules, which is really able to guarantee the stable 
proceduralization of conflict resolution as well as, in the most favorable cases, 
cooperation. States thus comply with international law only insofar as this 
compliance coincides with their immediate and egoistic interests, so that the 
legal framework of relations among political communities is left with a very 
modest normative consistency.
The concept of strategic rationality applied by Goldsmith and Posner is, 
however, affected by some deficits — even if we adopt the rational choice 
perspective. First, they presuppose that states interact exclusively vis-à-vis 
each other, while it is rather reasonable to assume that they are generally 
embedded in a broader and multipolar context, i.e., in so-called “international 
50 Gunther Teubner, Selbstsubversive Gerechtigkeit: Kontingenz- oder Transzen-
denzformel des Rechts? [Self-Overcoming Justice: Formula of Legal Contingency 
or of Transcendence?], 29 zeiTschrifT für rechTssoziologie [legal soc.] 9 
(2008).
51 golDsMiTh & PosNer, supra note 28.
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regimes.”52 Second, according to the understanding of rationality proposed 
by Goldsmith and Posner, actors — in this case, states — have predefined 
preferences which do not change during interaction. Contrarily, evidence 
shows that preferences shift in the course of interactions.53 Third, the definition 
of the elements the evaluation of which essentially contributes to making a 
choice rational may be considered shortsighted insofar as it excludes factors 
like “reputation” and “reciprocity.”54 Furthermore — and fourth — Goldsmith 
and Posner do not distinguish clearly between immediate payoffs and mid- as 
well as long-term interests. 
Precisely the difference between utilitas praesens and utilitas maxima — 
i.e., between immediate or highest payoffs — is central to strategic rationality’s 
approach to the question of the denial or support of solidarity. Indeed, while 
the strategic rationality of self-interest, regarded from the perspective of 
immediate payoffs, may be seen as a strong argument against solidarity, from a 
broader perspective, self-interest can also be considered as a claim in favor of 
it. Even if egoism is thought to bring immediate benefits, a more open attitude 
towards “others” may turn out to be of greater advantage in the long run. For 
example, taking into account the interests of the counterpart may reduce the 
risk of conflict, thereby also improving the chances of self-preservation and 
self-realization. In addition, the transfer of resources to “others” may induce 
secondary benefits for the solidaristic party - as, for instance, in the case of 
greater economic growth due to the increased economic and financial solidity of 
the counterpart, or of a reduction in environmental impact as a consequence of 
the introduction of environmental technologies or of easier access to financial 
resources. The strategic approach always maintains, however, that a rational 
52 roBerT o. keohaNe, afTer hegeMoNy: cooPeraTioN aND DiscorD iN The worlD 
PoliTical ecoNoMy 75, 85 (1984).
53 Nicole Deitelhoff, Was vom Tage übrig blieb. Inseln der Überzeugung im 
vermachteten Alltagsgeschäft internationalen Regierens [Communicative 
Interaction in Power-Related International Governance], in aNarchie Der 
koMMuNikaTiveN freiheiT: JürgeN haBerMas uND Die Theorie Der iNTerNaTioNaleN 
PoliTik [The aNarchy of coMMuNicaTive freeDoM: JürgeN haBerMas aND The 
Theory of iNTerNaTioNal PoliTics] 26 (Peter Niesen & Benjamin Herborth 
eds., 2007); Harald Müller, Internationale Verhandlungen, Argumente und 
Verständigungshandeln [International Negotiations, Arguments and Consensus-
Oriented Action], in aNarchie Der koMMuNikaTiveN freiheiT, supra, at 199; 
Thomas Risse, Global Governance und kommunikatives Handeln [Global 
Governance and Communicative Action], in aNarchie Der koMMuNikaTiveN 
freiheiT, supra, at 57.
54 aNDrew T. guzMaN, how iNTerNaTioNal law works: a raTioNal choice Theory 
33 (2008).
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action must aim at maximizing the gains of the individual actor, and that these 
gains, generally, must be clearly measurable in terms of concrete advantages. 
On these terms, the question regarding how we should meet the attitude 
of the so-called “free-riders” remains unanswered. Free-riders comply with 
the rules of interaction — in our case, the rules which guarantee an essential 
level of recognition for the arguments of “others”—only as long as they see 
in this behavior a gain for themselves. Therefore, they are always prone to 
breaking the rules as soon as they see a greater advantage to them from such a 
breach: under the premises of the definition of rationality as the maximization 
of individual gains, there can be no doubt that the behavior of the free-rider 
appears to be, here, the most rational choice. Yet it is difficult to imagine how 
social interaction can be stabilized under these conditions. As regards the 
preconditions for a functioning democracy, it has been argued that instrumental 
rationality cannot build the dispositional foundation that is indispensable for 
a society of citizens committed to achieving freedom and justice.55 The same 
can be said with reference to the dispositional framework of international 
relations that is aimed at concretizing peace, mutual recognition, the guarantee 
of fundamental rights and justice.
Therefore, even if we overcome the shortsighted point of view that privileges 
immediate advantages of the individual actors in order to adopt a position 
that pays more attention to long-term benefits, strategic reason cannot really 
explain why the strongest and the wealthiest should owe solidarity to the 
weakest and the poorest, namely to those from the enhancement of whose 
life conditions they will not draw any profit, either immediately or in the 
foreseeable future.
D. Holistic Rationality
A fourth approach considers rationality in a holistic sense. According to this, 
solidarity is owed to every human being for the simple fact that he/she is 
thought to be a member of universal humanity, considered to share fundamental 
values and interests. The “whole” of universal humanity is regarded as a fact, 
55 See karl-oTTo aPel, Diskurs uND veraNTworTuNg: Das ProBleM Des üBergaNgs 
zur PosTkoNveNTioNelleN Moral [Discourse aND resPoNsiBiliTy: The ProBleM of 
The TraNsiTioN To PosT-coNveNTioNal Morals] 26, 55 (1990); Karl-Otto Apel, 
Das Anliegen des anglo-amerikanischen “Kommunitarismus” in der Sicht der 
Diskursethik. Worin liegen die “kommunitären” Bedingungen der Möglichkeit 
einer post-konventionellen Identität der Vernunftperson? [The Concern of 
Anglo-American Communitarianism from the Perspective of Discourse Ethics], 
in geMeiNschafT uND gerechTigkeiT [coMMuNiTy aND socieTy] 149, 152 (Micha 
Brumlik & Hauke Brunkhorst eds., 1993).
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grounded on the essential ontological features of our species, in particular on 
the assumption of a natural sociability of humans.56
The idea of a universal community of humankind is a frequent topos of 
political and legal philosophy.57 The common values enshrined in international 
law, in this understanding, are not essentially the result of deliberative and 
inclusive processes, but are rather already present in re as an objective fact 
of reason that the rational observer simply has to recognize, international 
law to take over and formalize, and international adjudication to bring into 
effectiveness. More precisely, international law — or, at least, the most 
general part of it — has to be interpreted, against this background, as the 
legal expression of the activity of the international community and the most 
striking evidence of its existence: as the “common law of mankind,”58 it arises 
as the formalization of shared values as well as of the rules that guarantee the 
protection of common interests.59
56 On the imperialistic use of the assumption of a universal human fellowship, 
see Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereign Trusteeship and Empire, 16 TheoreTical 
iNquiries l. 447 (2015).
57 JohaNNes alThusius, PoliTica ch. IX, No. 22, at 92 (Harvard Univ. Press 1932) 
(1614); vikTor caThreiN, Die gruNDlage Des völkerrechTs [The fouNDaTioN 
of iNTerNaTioNal law] 45 (1918); 1 vikTor caThreiN, MoralPhilosoPhie 
[Moral PhilosoPhy] 111 (Vier Quellen Verlag, 6th ed. 1924); alfreD verDross, 
Die verfassuNg Der völkerrechTsgeMeiNschafT [The coNsTiTuTioN of The 
iNTerNaTioNal coMMuNiTy] (1926); alBerico geNTili, De Jure Belli liBri Tres 
[oN The law of war] bk. I, ch. XV, at 107 (Clarendon Press 1933) (1588); 
groTius, supra note 24, Prolegomena 6, 16, 17; saMuel PufeNDorf, De Jure 
NaTurae eT geNTiuM liBriocTo [oN The laws of NaTure aND PeoPles] bk. II, 
chs. II, III, VII, XV, bk. VIII, ch. VI (Hein 1995) (1672); saMuel PufeNDorf, 
De officio hoMiNis eT civis liBri Duo [oN The DuTy of MaN aND ciTizeN] bk. I, 
ch. VIII (Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1673); chrisTiaN wolff, iNsTiTuTioNes Juris 
NaTurae eT geNTiuM [iNsTiTuTioNs of The law of NaTure aND PeoPles] bk. IX, 
chs. I, V (Halle 1750); suarez, De legibus, supra note 8, bk. II, ch. XIX, No. 9, 
at 348. 
58 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind, 59 coluM. l. rev. 533 (1959).
59 herMaNN Mosler, The iNTerNaTioNal socieTy as a legal coMMuNiTy (1980); 
aNDreas l. Paulus, Die iNTerNaTioNale geMeiNschafT iM völkerrechT: 
eiNe uNTersuchuNg zur eNTwickluNg Des völkerrechTs iM zeiTalTer Der 
gloBalisieruNg [The iNTerNaTioNal coMMuNiTy iN iNTerNaTioNal law] (2001); 
MehrDaD PayaNDeh, iNTerNaTioNales geMeiNschafTsrechT [The law of The 
iNTerNaTioNal coMMuNiTy] (2010); BruNo siMMa, froM BilaTeralisM To 
coMMuNiTy iNTeresT iN iNTerNaTioNal law 217 (1994); chrisTiaN ToMuschaT, 
iNTerNaTioNal law: eNsuriNg The survival of MaNkiND oN The eve of a New 
ceNTury (1999); Ronald St. John Macdonald, The International Community 
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The close relationship between the justification of solidarity by resorting 
to the community of all humans and the noble and longstanding intellectual 
tradition of natural law, from antiquity until the present time, does not guarantee, 
however, the epistemological quality of the claim. Indeed, the case for solidarity 
depends here on the epistemological status of the proposition that “a universal 
human community exists which shares fundamental interests and values.” 
Trying to assess briefly the epistemological quality of this proposition, it has 
to be pointed out, first, that the expression cannot correspond to any kind 
of analytic judgment, since the assertions that such a community exists as 
well as that it shares values and interests are not originally contained in the 
subject of the proposition. Thus, the proposition must be a synthetic judgment, 
aiming at reaching some knowledge of the world. Furthermore, the judgment 
is a priori because it aims at building assertions which are necessary and 
universally valid. However, under a post-metaphysical approach a synthetic 
a priori judgment — i.e., a proposition that makes an assertion of necessary 
and universal validity and claims to improve our knowledge of the world 
— can only be acceptable if it is based on empirical evidence about the 
phenomenon. But, alas, the assertion that “a universal human community 
exists which shares fundamental interests and values” does not satisfy such 
a consistency condition, since empirical evidence of such a universal human 
community is rather controversial: indeed, there is no less evidence for the 
realistic assumption of a permanent struggle for survival between human 
communities.60
Therefore, the judgment claiming the existence of a universal human 
community turns out to be, rather, the result of the quasi-metaphysical 
ontologization of a transcendental capacity with which all humans are endowed, 
namely the faculty to interact and communicate with each other. In other words, 
the theory of the international community seems to draw upon the transcendental 
capacity to interact and to search for consensus in a communicative way, a 
presumed ontological matter of fact for which proper evidence is lacking. Yet, 
if the truth content of this claim were to prove to be uncertain, there would 
be no reason why we should regard our fellow humans as deserving our 
solidarity. Indeed, the content of the assertion — as any realistic analysis of 
the relations between states and individuals could easily demonstrate — is far 
as a Legal Community, in TowarDs worlD coNsTiTuTioNalisM: issues iN The 
legal orDeriNg of The worlD coMMuNiTy 853 (Ronald St. John Macdonald 
& Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005).
60 The long history of “realism” — from Thucydides to Kenneth Waltz and beyond, 
even if its assumptions are not fully shared — teaches us with some good reasons 
not to be too optimistic as regards the attitudes of fellow humans.
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from self-evident: humans can be no less prone to selfishness than to altruism. 
Thus, the pre-reflexive assumption of an ontologically sociable humanity is 
no more than a circular argument — and, therefore, rather wishful thinking 
— when it comes to proving the duty of solidarity.
E. Deconstructed Rationality
If the theory of the universal human community grounds its claim for solidarity 
on an alleged ontological truth, an additional approach defends the case for 
solidarity following the contrary strategy: while the first resorts to ontology, 
this latter denies any basis in re or even in a universal conception of reason. 
Here, solidarity is not a deducible universal duty, simply because no ontological 
fundament for universal rationality is presumed to be given. This conclusion 
is reached by resorting to the postmodern critique of modern rationalism and 
subjectivity.
Translated into the language of legal theory — in particular, the theory of 
international law — postmodern criticism of unitary and universal subjectivism 
maintains that international law is not the legal expression of an ontological, 
moral or epistemological universal truth: swinging necessarily between 
apology and utopia, its norms and practices are lacking objectivity and, thus, 
universal validity.61 Nonetheless, the critique of the universalistic claim of 
the international law discourse does not lead to sheer nihilism. Indeed, the 
international law theorists influenced by postmodern thinking accept the 
idea that some experiences may occur which are not characterized by mere 
contingency but take up, on the contrary, a kind of universal scope.62 From 
the postmodern standpoint, however, this unassuming universality is not 
based on abstract ontological, moral or epistemological principles, but is 
derived from the concrete experience of vulnerability among all involved 
individuals. Artistic expression is probably the most suitable way to give a 
voice of universal reach to a humanity made of concrete human beings. But 
the law, too, due to its formalism,63 can play a role in order to accomplish 
this task. Indeed, through the formal means of the law rights and duties are 
recognized with regard to all members of the community who hold the same 
position. As a consequence, the violation of my interests — which, without 
61 MarTTi koskeNNieMi, froM aPology To uToPia: The sTrucTure of iNTerNaTioNal 
legal arguMeNT, reissue wiTh a New ePilogue (2005).
62 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe Between Tradition and 
Renewal, 16 eur. J. iNT’l l. 113, 119 (2005).
63 MarTTi koskeNNieMi, The geNTle civilizer of NaTioN: The rise aND fall of 
iNTerNaTioNal law 1870-1960, at 500 (2001).
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the mediation of the law and without its formal character, would have a merely 
private character — is transformed “into a violation against everyone in my 
position” and, thus, into “a matter of concern for the political community 
itself.”64 
Following this interpretation, there is a non-ontological, non-moral and non-
epistemological universalism that originates specifically from a deconstructed 
idea of rationality. Reason, according to this understanding, does not help us 
to recognize objective and universal values, nor is it necessarily the means 
for the achievement of egoistic payoffs. Rather, every concrete individual 
applies practical reason to achieve his or her priorities, some individuals 
pursuing selfish interests, others concretizing altruistic attitudes. As a result, 
solidarity is not an obligation, but a choice that some actors — individuals 
or states — make following a sentiment of empathy towards the suffering of 
fellow humans. Rationality thus becomes a vehicle for the realization of the 
context-related preferences of the single individuals: insofar as we — alone 
or acting together — feel empathic towards the “fellow sufferers,”65 we may 
use the instruments that the deconstruction of rationality puts at our ethically 
unprejudiced disposal to ease their pain. Among these tools, a preeminent role 
should be played by the law, precisely because of its formal character that 
discharges it from the pretension of possessing an objective truth and makes it 
particularly suitable for different applications — in many cases, unfortunately, 
against the interests of the oppressed, but sometimes also in favor of them.
However, doubts arise as to whether this postmodern version of the 
universalism of the law can really justify the claim for solidarity as an obligation. 
Indeed, if no epistemological argument thought to substantiate the universality 
of international law is convincing, then neither is the universal dimension 
of legal formalism an assertion that every human being has to share. But 
the personal commitment based on empathy — regardless of how important 
empathy may be as a motivation of personal action — cannot offer a solid 
basis for a legal system necessarily related to the essential quality of the law 
as an “ought.” Empathy is fundamental but personal; the law, on the contrary, 
specifies the compelling rules which guarantee order in the interactions of an 
entire society — in the case of international law, even of the world society.66 
64 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 
CaMBriDge rev. iNT’l affairs 197, 214 (2004). 
65 richarD rorTy, coNTiNgeNcy, iroNy, aND soliDariTy, at xv (1989).
66 Herewith, I do not want to play down the role that emotions have within the legal 
discourse. See, on this topic, Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of 
Rights, 46 harv. c.r.-c.l. l. rev. 551 (2011); and Kathryn Abrams & Hila 
Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MiNN. l. rev. 1997 (2009-
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From the perspective of a deconstructed rationality, then, solidarity is merely 
optional, not a moral duty that, because of its universality, can and should be 
translated into legal norms. Moreover, it is almost impossible to justify the 
establishment of institutions with the task of fostering a better consideration of 
the interests of “others” by resorting to personal empathic attitudes. Solidarity 
may resort to empathy as regards the mindset of individuals, but it must rest 
on a psychologically neutral commandment of reason if it is to be seen as a 
general moral and legal duty and if it should be adequately substantiated by 
rules and practices.
F. Communicative Rationality
According to the communicative paradigm of social order, society is made 
up not only of functional systems, but also a lifeworld of intersubjective 
relations, which is characterized by different forms of interaction.67 In order 
to be well-ordered, which means peaceful, cooperative and effective, social 
interaction needs rules. When rules are positive and compelling, they are 
defined as laws, while the corpus juris that regulates a frame of common 
concern is referred to as public law. Therefore, the task of the legal system, 
which consists of stabilizing the normative expectations, is not related only 
or even just primarily to the performances of the functional subsystems, but 
refers rather to intersubjective interactions, or to the tension- and conflict-
filled relation between lifeworld and functional subsystems. Furthermore, 
each form of interaction is characterized by a specific aim that decisively 
influences its discursive contents. 
Yet, although the aim of the social interaction is essential to determine the 
contents of the discourse, the rationality embodied in the communication — 
mainly, but not only, at the linguistic level — is, from the perspective of the 
communicative paradigm, not exclusively and even not primarily functional. 
Rather, the communicative rationality — as follows from the understanding of 
2010). However, saying that law regulates interactions in which not only rational 
considerations but also emotions are involved is not the same as asserting that 
legal instruments should be seen as being at the disposal of individual priorities 
which do not need or even allow intersubjective justification — be it rational or 
emotional. 
67 aPel, supra note 39; aPel, supra note 55; Apel, supra note 55; JürgeN haBerMas, 
Theorie Des koMMuNikaTiveN haNDelNs (1981) (translated to English in JürgeN 
haBerMas, Theory of coMMuNicaTive acTioN (Thomas A. McCarthy trans., 
Beacon press 1984/1987)).
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communication here presupposed — always has a normative core.68 Precisely 
this normative essence, based on the general principle of mutual recognition, 
is what makes communicative rationality universal — thus different from 
the purely systemic rationalities and connected, from its very theoretical 
conception, to the tenet of solidarity towards “others.”
Jürgen Habermas — as the exponent of the communicative paradigm of 
order who transformed the epistemological premises of the communicative 
rationality into a comprehensive theory of public law69 — resumes Kant’s path-
68 The normative core of communicative rationality consists of the assumption 
that discursive communication can achieve its goal only if all those involved 
mutually presuppose that: a) from an objective perspective, the assertions 
are true (in the sense that the propositions refer to real situations or facts); 
b) from a subjective perspective, the speakers act truthfully (in the sense that 
they are committed to fair-minded purposes and are sincerely persuaded that 
their assertions meet the conditions for truth); and c) from an intersubjective 
perspective, the speakers interact according to the principles of rightness (in 
the sense that they accept that their assertions have to meet the criteria for a 
general and mutual acknowledgement by all participants in the communication). 
See JürgeN haBerMas, NachMeTaPhysisches DeNkeN 73, 105, 123 (1988) 
(translated to English in JürgeN haBerMas, PosTMeTaPhysical ThiNkiNg 
(William Mark Hohengarten trans., Polity Press 1992)); JürgeN haBerMas, 
vorsTuDieN uND ergäNzuNgeN zur Theorie Des koMMuNikaTiveN haNDelNs 
598 (1984) (translated to English in JürgeN haBerMas, oN The PragMaTics 
of social iNTeracTioN (Barbara Fultner trans., MIT Press 2001)); JürgeN 
haBerMas, wahrheiT uND rechTferTiguNg 110 (1999) (translated to English 
in JürgeN haBerMas, TruTh aND JusTificaTioN (Barbara Fultner trans., Polity 
Press 2003)).
69 JürgeN haBerMas, fakTiziTäT uND gelTuNg. BeiTräge zur DiskursTheorie Des 
rechTs uND Des DeMokraTischeN rechTssTaaTs (1992) (translated to English 
in JürgeN haBerMas, BeTweeN facTs aND NorMs (William Rehg trans. MIT 
Press 1996)); JürgeN haBerMas, Der gesPalTeNe wesTeN (2001) (translated to 
English in JürgeN haBerMas, The DiviDeD wesT (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity 
Press 2006)); Jürgen Habermas, Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische 
Weltgesellschaft? [A Political Constitution for the Pluralistic World Society?], 38 
KriTische JusTiz 222, 228 (2005); Jürgen Habermas, Kommunikative Rationalität 
und grenzüberschreitende Politik: eine Replik [Communicative Rationality and 
Transboundary Politics], in aNarchie Der koMMuNikaTiveN freiheiT, supra note 
53, at 439; Jürgen Habermas, Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und die 
Legitimationsprobleme einer verfassten Weltgemeinschaft [The Constitutionization 
of International Law and the Legitimacy Problems of a Constitutionalized World 
Society], in rechTsPhilosoPhie iM 21. JahrhuNDerT [legal PhilosoPhy iN The 
21sT ceNTury] 368 (Winfried Brugger, Ulfried Neumann & Stephan Kirste eds., 
2008).
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breaking tripartite division of public law.70 From the intersubjective perspective 
of the communicative rationality, each level of public law corresponds to 
the legal regulation of a specific kind of social interaction. At the first level, 
domestic public law regulates the interactions between citizens of each single 
political community as well as between these citizens and the institutions 
of the same polity. The use of communicative reason and the application of 
its normative prerequisites guarantee, here, that decisions are taken through 
deliberative processes based on the reflexive involvement of the citizens. 
Thus, legitimate sovereignty — according to the communicative paradigm 
— cannot but be “bottom-up.” At the second level, international public law 
addresses the relations between citizens of different states insofar as they are 
primarily regarded as citizens of the state; therefore, the relations between 
individuals which are here the object of regulation are processed through the 
form of relations between states. Lastly, at the third level, the cosmopolitan 
law is regarded as the public law that regulates the direct interactions between 
individuals from different states as well as between individuals and the states 
of which they are not citizens. 
This third level is necessary given the fact that individuals meet and 
interact with each other, outside the borders of single states, regardless of their 
belonging to a specific political community. “Cosmopolitan law” consists, 
therefore, precisely of those principles and rules that guarantee a peaceful and 
cooperative interaction between humans within this most general context of 
interaction, namely beyond the condition of belonging to an individual state. 
Embedded in these rules is the fundamental recognition that we owe to every 
human being as the consequence of the universal capacity to communicate. 
In this sense, solidarity is an obligation and its essential principles and norms 
have necessarily to be laid down as a fundamental part of the most universal 
corpus of public law.
Summing up, the case for the obligation of solidarity is based, from the 
perspective of the communicative rationality, on the following considerations 
— which are regarded by its supporters as descriptive as well as prescriptive 
assertions.71 First, we are — increasingly — exposed to interaction with 
70 See kaNT, supra note 27.
71 Following a well-established tradition that runs, at least, from Plato to Hegel and 
beyond, the exponents of the communicative paradigm of rationality assume, 
in the analysis of social phenomena, that the descriptive dimension cannot be 
clearly distinguished from the prescriptive (or normative) level. This merging 
of the two dimensions is due to a twofold circumstance that characterizes social 
interaction: first, the fact that social communication, in order to work, always 
contains a normative nucleus, see supra note 68; and, second, the fact that social 
discourse constantly aims at a normative definition of the identity of the social 
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fellow humans, who do not belong to our individual social group. Second, 
we share with them the same rationality which contains a normative core of 
mutual recognition. Third, this interaction — like any other kind of human 
interaction — needs to be protected in order to guarantee its peaceful and, 
from the most favorable perspective, also cooperative unfolding. Fourth, 
from this necessity arise obligations which are moral (for the individual) as 
well as political and legal (for the whole society). Fifth, these obligations are 
“thinner” at the global than at the national or local level, due to the less intense 
interaction that occurs in the first case; as a result, the global obligations are 
limited to the guarantee of peace and of the most fundamental human rights. 
Sixth, insofar as actions by a sovereign power affect the most fundamental 
rights of aliens, the latter are entitled to demand that their justified rights be 
adequately taken into account; from the opposite point of view, i.e., from the 
standpoint of the sovereign power, this right corresponds to an obligation 
of solidarity. Seventh, the obligation of solidarity involves the taking into 
account, by the sovereign power, of the protection of all essential human rights 
of aliens — including civil, political, social and economic rights as well as 
even, to a certain extent, the third-generation rights — that are considered 
indispensable for a dignified human interaction and may be endangered by 
actions of the sovereign power.
Founding the case for solidarity on the communicative paradigm, i.e., 
interpreting it as part of the normative protection for that kind of communication 
which occurs when individuals interact within the most general horizon, 
the shortcomings can be avoided that affected the abovementioned kinds of 
rationality: namely, a) solidarity is not regarded as the result of a farsighted 
expediency, since communication is the expression of a non-strategic use 
of practical reason; b) the claim for a non-egoistic approach refrains from 
metaphysical assumptions insofar as the communicative capacity with which 
all humans are endowed has a merely transcendental — or better, linguistic-
pragmatic — quality; and c) solidarity does not depend on individual preferences 
or personal commitment, but is a normative duty, necessary in order to guarantee 
the basic conditions for human interaction at the most general level, which 
has to be translated into an adequate ethical and legal framework.72
group, thus going beyond the mere elaboration of empirical data. As regards 
this second aspect, see JürgeN haBerMas, erkeNNTNis uND iNTeresse 221 (1973) 
(translated to English in JürgeN haBerMas, kNowleDge aND huMaN iNTeresTs 
(Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Polity Press 1987)).
72 From this perspective, the duties that we have towards our fellow humans are 
prima facie of a moral nature since they bind us as individuals who are capable of 
acting reasonably and are intersubjectively expected to give generally shareable 
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III. concluSIon: towArdS A new concept of SovereIgnty
In order to meet the challenges of the post-national constellation, which has 
been generated by ever deeper worldwide interconnections, the concept of 
sovereignty has to be reshaped. In particular, sovereignty should no longer 
be understood as the condition in which an authority does not recognize any 
higher power above itself, but rather as the situation in which public power 
is legitimately exercised. In other words, in the contemporary context only 
legitimate power should be seen as sovereign power.
The first implication of this tenet touches upon the sources of sovereignty. 
Given the centrality of legitimacy, on the one hand, and the assumption that, 
from a post-metaphysical standpoint, only the democratic process fulfils the 
criteria for at least the possibility of a reflexive legitimation of authority, the 
consequence is that the only acceptable source for sovereignty is the one 
that comes bottom-up, i.e., ascending from the free will of the governed.73 
However, if the legitimacy of sovereignty were limited just to this tenet, 
nothing would be achieved as regards solidarity towards “others,” or openness 
to their needs and arguments: a public power may be legitimated from below, 
and nevertheless selfish.
Indeed, the idea of a solidaristic sovereignty needs more than just a bottom-
up legitimacy: it requires also a specific concept of rationality, which should 
itself be better adapted to the conditions of an increasingly interconnected 
world. Different conceptions of rationality have been scrutinized in the 
justifications for their actions. But they are political duties too, insofar as they 
have to be implemented by an international community made up of political 
actors, such as states, structures of international governance and organizations 
of the cosmopolitan civil society.
73 The question here is what should be done with regard to states that are sovereign 
in the traditional meaning (in the sense that they exercise power over a population 
within a delimited territory), but are not democratically legitimate. Surely, 
my argument should not be interpreted as a plea for their exclusion from the 
international law discourse. International law is inclusive — and should remain 
so. Yet a two-level approach may be here useful to meet the problem. At a first 
level, democratic states should always include non-democratic — and therefore, 
in a normative sense, not properly sovereign — states in international law 
agreements. Nevertheless, at the second level, the final goal of democratic states in 
pursuing these agreements and complying with them has to be, without exception, 
the restoration of conditions of full democratic and popular sovereignty in all 
political communities. In other words, even if it is often necessary to talk with 
tyrants, the ultimate purpose of these talks should always be the overcoming of 
tyranny. 
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former Part, with attention paid specifically to their respective implications 
for the justification and the implementation of solidarity.74 One of these 
conceptions — particularistic rationality — has proven to reject solidarity 
as a necessary consequence of its core theoretical assumptions. A second — 
functional rationality — albeit substantially indifferent to the question, does 
not deliver any argument in favor of a more-than-system-oriented approach 
to the interests of aliens. A third — strategic rationality — can be used for 
both purposes, in favor or against solidarity, but its case for the openness to 
needs and arguments of aliens proves to be actually rather shaky. The last three 
conceptions of rationality are altogether explicitly for solidarity; however, 
the holistic and the postmodern approaches are affected by argumentative 
deficits that make them to a certain extent unconvincing as well. 
Thus, as a result of the analyses presented above, it can be maintained that 
sovereign actors have an obligation of solidarity only if they deploy, in their 
actions, a practical use of reason, i.e., a rationality that is non-particularistic 
(meaning universalistic), non-functional as well as non-strategic (or consent-
oriented), non-holistic (i.e., it avoids any metaphysical or ontological 
presuppositions), and non-deconstructed (meaning deontological). In other 
words, universalism, consent-orientation, as well as a post-metaphysical and 
deontological attitude are the inescapable conditions under which the use of 
reason by a sovereign actor can lead to the determination of solidarity as an 
obligation and as a compelling legal norm. Communicative rationality meets 
these requisites, paving the way, therefore, for an understanding of sovereignty 
which is, at the same time, legitimated by the individuals who are subject to 
the sovereign power as well as open to “others.” 
From the communicative perspective, every individual is always involved 
in different forms of interactions: as a citizen with the other citizens of his/
her political community, and as a human being with all other fellow humans 
inside as well as outside his/her community. As a result, the legitimacy of a 
sovereign public power is guaranteed only if it comes from the governed not 
only in their role as citizens of the polity, but also in their no less important 
74 On this point, it should be briefly added that the different uses of reason transversally 
cross the sources of sovereignty. This means that each source of sovereignty can 
come along with more than one use of reason, as well as that some conceptions 
of rationality can combine with just one source of sovereignty, while other are 
compatible with both kinds. More concretely, particularistic rationality can sustain 
both a democratic and an autocratic sovereign. The same goes for the strategic 
and holistic rationalities, while systemic reason seems to be rather indifferent to 
democratic legitimacy. Only the deconstructed and the communicative rationalities 
are exclusively compatible with “bottom-up” legitimacy, although the results 
are eventually quite different. 
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position as citizens of the “cosmopolis,” or simply as human beings.75 If we 
take this point of view, the legitimacy of sovereignty has a two-level structure, 
domestic and cosmopolitan. Thus, a sovereign power will be legitimate only 
if it takes into account, along with the rights and interests of the citizens of 
its own polity, also the justified claims of the international community.
Seen this way, sovereignty takes a quite unusual form, maybe even disturbing 
for those who still think in traditional patterns of law and politics. However, 
even if we do not refrain from the conceptual challenge, there is still a long 
way to go: new ideas may show the direction, but the edifice then needs to 
be built with materials made of legal instruments and political agreements. In 
particular, it is essential to address the question of how the moral obligation 
of solidarity that decisively contributes to the redefinition of sovereignty 
can be translated into legal norms. So far, rather marginal anticipations 
of institutional ways of opening the internal fora to justified interests of 
non-citizens can be found in international, supranational and national legal 
instruments.76 Furthermore, “solidarity” remains a highly contested concept 
in international law.77 To highlight the uncertain status of solidarity within the 
international law discourse, two cases may be recalled. First, the debate on 
solidarity within the Human Rights Council has met strong skepticism from 
75 From this perspective, every single individual has to accomplish two different 
roles: on the one hand the role as a citizen of a particular polity with its specific 
interests, and on the other the role of a “citizen of the world” who is committed 
to the defense of universal values. Provided that the first belonging is much 
“thicker” than the second, in the sense that more duties are generated from it — 
in particular as regards the redistribution of resources — and that these duties 
may imply a much larger constraint on individual interests, the question arises 
on the dilemmas that can grow from the distinction between the two roles. In 
order to prevent that these inescapable dilemmas degenerate into unsolvable 
contradictions, a criterion may be regarded as essential: no action that may arise 
from the status as a citizen of a specific political community can violate the 
duties derived from the more general cosmopolitan condition. In other words, 
we are allowed to do for our fellow citizens (in a particularistic sense) more 
than what we would to for aliens, but nothing of this can run against the basic 
rights and interests of our fellow humans.
76 See Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability 
of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 aM. J. iNT’l l. 295, 314, 319 (2013).
77 See Sergio Dellavalle, Opening the Forum to the “Others”: Is There an Obligation 
to Take Non-National Interests into Account Within National Political and 
Juridical Decision-Making-Processes?, 6 göTTiNger J. iNT’l l. (forthcoming 
2014).
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many, in particular Western, countries.78 Second, although the recently issued 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights undoubtedly represent a significant 
step forward on the way to the recognition of a not only moral but also legal 
obligation of solidarity, it is quite unclear, to this day, what effect they will 
concretely have.79
In conclusion, the successful implementation of a new concept of sovereignty 
through legal instruments and political practices is anything but guaranteed. 
Yet in a context of inescapable existential uncertainty, it would be already a 
great accomplishment if we could reasonably believe that we know which 
future of sovereignty we are working toward.
78 Consider, for example, the controversial adoption of the Human Rights Council 
Res. 15/13 on Human Rights and Solidarity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/13 (Sept. 
30, 2010).
79 See O. De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 34 huM. rTs. q. 4 (2012).
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